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INTRODUCTION

EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION over statutory claims, wrongful
discharge, and work-related torts causes an enormous burden that is difficult for the American judicial system to support.'
It is equally difficult for plaintiffs and defendants involved, because litigation is costly and cases can drag on for years before
an outcome is reached. This is particularly troubling in the airline industry, where quality and effective transportation mandate a relatively problem-free workplace.
For example, between 1971 and 1993, employment cases filed
in federal court have increased by almost 430%.2 In 1993, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) received
nearly 90,000 discrimination charges, compared with approximately 9000 in 1966. 3 As a result, employers and employees
alike are turning to alternatives to litigation, such as arbitration,
as a quick and inexpensive means of settling disputes arising in
the workplace. 4 Arbitration through the Railway Labor Act system boards has been the standard in the highly unionized air1 Robert A. Machson & Joseph P. Monteleone, Insurance Coverage for Wrongful
Employment Practices Claims Under Various Liability Policies, Bus. LAw., Feb. 1994, at
689-90.
2 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP'T OF COM., COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF

108-10 (1994) (Exhibit
IV-3).
3 Id. See also Corporate Legal Times Roundtable, Catch 22: Informed Legal Employees Sue More Training,ADR Offer Best Hope of HaltingSurge in Disputes and Defense
Costs, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, June 1995, at 34 (Andrew Steinberg, associate general
counsel for American Airlines, Inc., stating that the number of discrimination
charges filed against American Airlines has at least tripled since 1990).
4 Thomas J. Piskorski & David B. Ross, PrivateArbitration as the Exclusive Means
of Resolving Employment-Related Disputes, EMPLOYEE REL. L.J., Autumn 1993, at 205.
WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, FACT FINDING REPORT
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line industry, but recently employers have concerns about the
ability to use arbitration to resolve every employee dispute.5
The Railway Labor Act (RILA) is the statute regulating the railroad and airline industries. The RLA authorizes the creation of
system boards to resolve minor disputes, that is, disputes between employees and the airlines regarding the interpretation
and application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules,
and working conditions.6 These system boards supposedly have
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve minor disputes,7 but recently,
some courts have allowed certain types of claims to escape the
arbitral provisions of the RLA and be pursued in court.8 This is
spurred, in part, by judicial concerns about an employee's right
to a judicial forum.9
This Comment will discuss the possibility that courts may begin allowing some union employee claims to bypass the arbitral
provisions of the RLA and provide some possible solutions to
this problem. First, the Comment will give a brief synopsis of
the Railway Labor Act, which is the regulatory framework within
which employers in the airline industry are required to structure
almost all of their union employee agreements. This section will
focus on the evolution of the ambiguous phrase "minor dispute," which is the benchmark to determine if disputes are to be
mandated for arbitration under the RLA. This section will also
discuss a new willingness by some courts to allow employees to
5 See Thomas P. Brown, 1V & Lester R. Aponte, The Shrinking Doctrine of Preemption Under the Railway Labor Act: The Hawaiian Airlines Case, EMPLOYEE REL. L.J.,
Winter 1994/1995, at 369.
6 Michael H. Campbell & Joshua M. Javits, Grievance Procedures: The Carrier's
Perspective, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: AIRLINE & R.R. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L.,
Apr. 18, 1996, at 55, 361 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1994)). See also Corporate Legal
Times Roundtable, supra note 3, at 34.
7 Joanna L. Moorhead, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Under the Railway
Labor Act, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: AIRLINE & R.R. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L.,
Apr. 18, 1996, at 393, 395; see also Peter M. Panken et al., Avoiding Employment
Litigation: Alternative Dispute Resolution of Employment Disputes in the 90s, ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION & CMVL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS, June 1, 1995, at 681.

8 See Gilbert M. Roman, Workers' Rights May Extend Beyond Labor Union Contract,
ROCKY MTN. NEWS, July 17, 1994, at 2C.
9 Panken et al., supra note 7, at 687. "There are judges who view trial before
judge and jury as a 'right' bestowed by Congress, rather than merely an alternative forum. These judges attempt to find ways around the direction set forth in
Gilmer." Id. See also Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 114 S.Ct. 2239, (1994); Felt
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 60 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1995); Gay v. Courlson, 60 F.3d 83 (2nd Cir. 1995); Hirras v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 44 F.3d
278 (5th Cir. 1995); Bates v. Long Island R.R., 997 F.2d 1028 (2nd Cir. 1993).
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pursue their claims in court, rather than within the RLA
framework.
The Comment's focus will then shift to potential solutions
which will require that all employee disputes be sent to arbitration. The Comment will address the possibility of incorporating
federal civil rights statutes and unwritten customs into collectivebargaining agreements as a way to invoke RIA jurisdiction. Finally, the Comment will address the use of mandatory arbitration agreements as a means of recapturing employee disputes
determined to be outside the jurisdiction of the RLA. The Comment will explore the benefits of arbitration, modern use of
mandatory arbitration agreements, problems modern courts
and other groups have had with mandatory arbitration clauses,
and precautions employers should adhere to when drafting
these agreements.
II.

THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT AND JURISDICTION OF
THE "MINOR DISPUTE"

Congress passed the RLA as a statutory scheme for final and
binding resolution of railroad employee grievances. 10 The RIA
was originally passed only to help regulate the railroad industry,
but the fledgling airline industry petitioned Congress in 1936 to
include the airline industry under the scope of the Act, since
both industries were marked by the use of collective bargaining.1 One of Congress's goals in passing the RLA was to remove a large number of transportation employee causes of
action from the judicial forum to avoid interruptions to commerce. 12 There were concerns that disputes between major labor groups and carriers in the airline or railroad
industries
13
could quickly bring transportation to a standstill.
As a result, the duty to use the RLA's arbitral provisions is
statutory and unconditional, thus eliminating the authority of
the courts in connection with the process of contract interpreta10 Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'r v. Louisville & N. R.R., 373 U.S. 33
(1963).
11William E. Thoms & Frank J. Dooley, Collective Bargaining Under the Railway
Labor Act, 20 TRANSP. LJ. 275, 284 (1992) (citing 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1996)).
12 SeeJohn B. O'Clarke,Jr., Collective BargainingUnder the Railway Labor Act: The
Labor Organization'sPerspective, 1996 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY AIRLINE & R.R.
LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L., Apr. 18, 1996, at 303; Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 181-88 (1996).
13 Gregory G. Sarno, Preemption By Railroad Labor Act of Employee's State-Law Action for Infliction of Emotional Distress, 104 A.L.R. Fed. 548 (1991).
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tion as much as possible to expedite resolution.

4

It is clear that

Congress did not intend to strip any employees of their rights,
but rather to install a program that would resolve disputes faster
than courts and with the same or similar results. The RLA mandates arbitration through system boards for what are termed by
the Act as "minor disputes."' 15 Airline and railroad industries are
required to create these system boards, which typically consist of
an equal number of employee and union members. 6 In the

event of a deadlock, the parties may pick an additional neutral

7
member whose decision is binding on both parties.1
The RLA requires that all minor disputes which arise "out of
grievances, or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning ... rules, or working conditions" be submit-

ted to final and binding arbitration before system boards set up

by either the airline or the railroad.'I While the language of the
Act was very clear about the quick and final nature of the arbitration through system boards, what was not originally clear was
which situations constituted "minor disputes." It was particularly difficult to understand how to apply the RLA framework to
the specific categories of employment disputes.
Courts eventually established that adjustment boards were the
only tribunals with proper jurisdiction over work-related claims
falling under the category of "minor dispute."1 9 Therefore, any
cause of action brought in a court or before an administrative
14 Gary S. Green &James K. Lobenz, Grievance Resolution and the System Board of
Adjustment-The Labor Organization Perspective, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: AIRLINE & R.R. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L., Apr. 18, 1996, at 333, 355.
15 Id. at 336.
16 Id. at 359.

Id.
18 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1996).
17

"Major disputes involve the formation of collectivebargaining agreements or changes in the terms of existing agreements." Roland
P. Wilder, Jr. & Christy Concannon, JudicialEnforcement of the Railway Labor Act,
ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: AIRLINE & R.R. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L., Apr. 18, 1996,
at 505, 507 (citing Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945);
Association of Flight Attendants v. U.S. Air, Inc., 146 L.R.R.M. 2535 (D.C.Cir.
1994)).
19 Walker v. Southern Ry. Co., 385 U.S. 196 (1966) (per curiam). The United
States Supreme Court held, while interpreting the RLA, that the "[p]rovision for
arbitration of a discharge grievance, a minor dispute, is not a matter or voluntary
agreement under the RLA; the Act compels parties to arbitrate minor disputes
before the National Railroad Adjustment Board established under the Act." Id. at
198 (citing Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. Ry. Co., 353
U.S. 30, 34 (1957)) (emphasis added). This decision reinforced the idea that the
system boards maintain exclusive jurisdiction of all minor disputes, including
those involving employment disputes. Id.
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agency would be dismissed for lack of proper subject matter jurisdiction. 2' The RLA requires employees to use its arbitration
provisions for minor disputes in order to realize Congress's intent to avoid gridlock in America's transportation industries.21
If employees were given a choice of forum, groups of employees
could choose to go to court, knowing that the delay it would
cause could give them a strategic bargaining advantage over
their employers. This would inevitably cause the possible strikes
and work shortages the authors of the RLA had specifically attempted to avoid.
III.

THE BROAD INTERPRETATION OF "MINOR
DISPUTE"

Essentially, the concept of "minor dispute" serves as a gate to
determine the kinds of disputes that are allowed to enter arbitration under the RLA. As a result, determining what factors
comprise a minor dispute becomes very important, because the
methods and forum of resolution hinge on how the dispute is
characterized. Initially, the factors that courts should use to distinguish a "minor dispute" from a normal dispute were elusive,
but the definition became more comprehensible over time as
different courts announced what situations should be construed
as "minor disputes."
A.

THE BURLEY COURT'S DEFINITION OF "MINOR DISPUTE"

The Supreme Court first addressed the term "minor dispute"
in Elgin, J. & E. Railway Co. v. Burley.22 In Burley, a group of
employees sued the railroad for violating the employees' collective-bargaining agreement, arguing that they were required by
the company to put in time that violated specific time allocations within the collective-bargaining agreement. After the Labor Board (a type of system board expressly authorized by the
RLA to address the dispute) took up the matter, a great deal of
controversy ensued about whether the union, involved on behalf of the workers, had the authority to release individual
claims or submit them to the Labor Board. Also, the validity of
20 See Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 406 U.S. 320, 322, 325 (1972);
Richard Schoolman, Developments in the Preemption of Otherwise JusticiableEmployment-Related Claims by the Railway Labor Act and the FederalAviation Act and the Fed-

eral Railroad Safety Act, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY:
EMPLOYMENT L., Oct. 13, 1994, at 531, 533.
21
22

AIRLINE & R.R. LAB. &

Union Pac. R.R. v. Sheenan, 439 U.S. 89, 94 (1978).
325 U.S. 711 (1945).
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the judgment and conclusive effect of the Labor Board's award,
as well as the scope of the Labor Board's authority, was
questioned.
The Burley Court paved the way for the modern interpretation
of the RLA dispute resolution provisions by determining that
Congress had "distinguished disputes concerning the making of
collective agreements ... [from] ... disputes over grievances. "23
The Court stated that:
The [minor] dispute relates either to the meaning or proper application of a particular provision [from a collective-bargaining
agreement] with reference to a specific situation or to an omitted case. In the later event the claim is founded upon some incident of the employee relation, or an asserted one, independent
of those covered by the collective-bargaining agreement, e.g.,
claims on account of personal injuries. In either case the claim is
to rights accrued, not merely to have new ones created for the
future.2 4
The Burley definition spans a broad range of claims because it
seemingly allows for preemption by the RLA for all claims arising from any incident of employment. The language "incident
of employment" encompasses such a wide variety of actions, it
makes a precise definition difficult at best. Since almost all
claims could in some way be tied to "an incident of employment," a great deal of cases were preempted by the mandatory
arbitration provisions of the RLA under Burley.2 5
B.

THE CONSOLIDA TED RAIL COURT'S DEFINITION OF

"MINOR DISPUTE"

The definition of the phrase "minor dispute" was further clarified by the Supreme Court in the 1989 case Consolidated Rail v.

Railway Labor Executives Ass n.26 In Consolidated Rail, the union

attempted to secure an injunction against a mandatory drugtesting program that was implemented by the railroad. The
23 Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor Relations on the Airlines: The Railway Labor
Act in the Era of Deregulation, 42 STAN. L. Ruv. 1485, 1504-05 (1990).
24 Burley, 325 U.S. at 723.
25 Schoolman, supra note 20, at 725. See Majors v. U.S. Air, Inc., 525 F. Supp.
853, 857 (D. Md. 1981) ("So long as [a] claim is founded on some incident of the
employment relation, it is immaterial, for purposes of coverage by the [RLA],
whether the claim is expressly covered by the collective-bargaining agreement, or
is independent of that agreement.") (citing Burley, 325 U.S. at 723); Melanson v.
United Air Lines, 931 F.2d 558, 564 (9th Cir. 1991).
26 491 U.S. 299 (1989).

1124

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

union contested the program because the collective-bargaining
agreement required that this type of action by the railroad be
first cleared by union members. Consolidated Rail, attempting
to relegate the dispute to the RLA's arbitral provisions, argued
that the dispute was minor, because it could be resolved simply
by interpreting the existing collective-bargaining agreement.
But the plaintiffs contended that the lack of a federal cause of
action would rob a party of other remedies that might be afforded by a court of law, but that would essentially be denied by
mandatory arbitration.
The Court announced that "[w]here an employer asserts a
contractual right to take the contested action, the ensuing dispute is minor if the action is arguably justified by the terms of
the parties' collective-bargaining agreement. Where, in contrast, the employer's claims are frivolous or obviously insubstantial, the dispute is major. ' 27 The Court ultimately agreed with
Consolidated Rail, finding that the dispute was minor because
the drug-testing program was justified under the collective-bargaining agreement. 2 As a result, the only method by which employees in the airline and railroad industries could reach the
judicial forum with a minor dispute were instances in which federal law provided independent grounds upon which the employee could litigate the claim. ConsolidatedRail only reinforced
the effects of Burley, requiring airline and railroad workers to
resolve disputes in the administrative agencies set up by the
RLA, if the disputed action was "arguably justified" by the applicable collective-bargaining agreement. 29 But the Consolidated
Rail case also indicated the Court's willingness to scrutinize collective-bargaining agreements closer to ensure that the RLA is
being properly invoked."0
IV. MAJOR REVISION: THE HAWAIIAN AIRLINES
COURT'S DEFINITION OF "MINOR DISPUTE"
Airlines and railroads were able to use arbitration effectively
under the Burley and Consolidated Rail definitions because virtually all disputes were mandated to RLA arbitration. However,
the definition of "minor dispute" suffered a major revision in
the Supreme Court's recently decided Hawaiian Airlines v. Nor1d. at 299.
Id. at 320.
!9 Campbell & Javits, supra note 6, at 358.

27
28

30

Id.
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ris.31 The Court scaled back the kinds of causes of action that
could be recaptured under the arbitration provisions of the
RLA, making it difficult for airlines to bring all employee disputes in arbitration.
In Hawaiian Airlines, a mechanic was fired after refusing to
sign a maintenance log which would have indicated to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that the airplane he was
servicing was in need of repair. Norris disagreed with his superiors that the airplane was safe and when he refused to sign a
routine safety report, he was fired. Norris then sued the airline
in state court for retaliatory discharge in violation of Hawaii's
Whistle Blower Protection Act.
Initially, the Hawaiian Supreme Court allowed Norris to bring
his claim in state court, bypassing the RLA. 2 When the case was
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, attorneys for the
airline argued that the Hawaiian Supreme Court decision was
basically an attempt to rewrite the plain language of the 1926
Railway Labor Act in the name of public policy, undercutting
Congressional intent.33 But the United States Supreme Court
rejected this line of reasoning by the airline that the RLA "requires employees to submit all employment-related claims to arbitration, not litigation."3 4 Justice Harry Blackmun wrote that
"whether federal law preempts a state law establishing a cause of
action is a question of congressional intent... [n]o proposed
interpretation demonstrates a clear and manifest congressional
purpose to create a regime that broadly preempts substantive
protections extended by the [s] tates, independent of any negotiated labor agreement.

'3'

During oral argument before the

Court, Justice Blackmun was concerned that the only prong of
protection Norris could invoke against a wrongful discharge was
state law.36 This would allow the dispute to go to court, because
it would involve a violation of rights by an employer, which, in
31 512 U.S. 246 (1994).

842 P.2d 634 (Haw. 1992).
s3Clinton Administration Favors Giving Airline Mechanic a Chance at State Remedy,
DmALY LAB. REP., Apr. 29, 1994, at D5 [hereinafter Clinton Administration].
34 Wabash Plans to Bring Roadrailer to China, U.S. RAIL NEWS, July 8, 1994.
35 HawaiianAirlines, 114 S. Ct. at 2239.
36 Supreme Court Says Railway Labor Act Can't Preempt Tort Suits, LiABILrry WK.,
June 27, 1994; see also Mary L. Kandyba, ProtectingRailroad Workers with the ADA,
TRIAL, Mar. 1, 1995 ("[T]he Court's rejection of the preemption argument on
the state tort claims logically compels the conclusion that the railroad worker's
rights to pursue a federal law claim under the ADA should not be impeded by the
RLA.").
32
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turn, is something the courts would likely have an interest in
hearing. This application of the whistle blower statute was condoned by the Clinton administration because it seemingly furthered employee rights, directly contradicted the intent of the
RLA to have all minor disputes decided in arbitration to protect
the operation of the nation's transportation industries. 7
The Supreme Court ultimately agreed with Norris, allowing
the mechanic to bypass arbitration and litigate his claim in
court." This marked a substantial change in the interpretation
of "minor dispute," because for the first time the Court shifted
from a preference for the Congressionally mandated arbitration
provisions of the RLA and the Federal Arbitration Act to a preference for employee civil rights.
Where the Burley and the Consolidated Rail decisions allowed
for any type of employment related cause of action to be classified as a "minor dispute," the Court held in Hawaiian Airlines
that the language of the RLA mandated that the only claims that
could be preempted from state law were those that could be specifically tied to the collective-bargaining agreement.39 The
Court distinguished the obvious inconsistency of this decision
with the Burley case by classifying that Court's broadly interpreted phrase "founded upon some incident of the employment
relationship" as dicta.' The Court in Hawaiian Airlines reasoned that the case in Burley only involved the interpretation of
the collective-bargaining agreement and did not directly involve
any causes of action arising outside of the collective-bargaining
agreement.4 ' Any rulings setting standards for claims outside of
a collective-bargaining agreement did not affect the Burley case
and were mere dicta.42 As a result, the Hawaiian Airlines decision set a new standard restricting preemption by the RLA to
those claims that would require interpretation or application of
an RLA agreement and allowed those claims which could be resolved without looking at such a collective-bargaining agreement to go to the judicial forum, bypassing the RLA'a
mandatory arbitration provisions.
37 Clinton Administration, supra note 33, at D5.
38 Hawaiian Airlines, 114 S. Ct. at 2251.
39

Id. at 2244-45.

40

Id. at 2250 (citing Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945)).

41 Id.
42

Id.

43

Id.
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This new framework for RLA preemption fashioned in Hawaiian Airlines was partially borrowed from the Court's previously
established method of dealing with cases involving Section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).44 The LMRA
also preempts state law only in instances where the state law
claims are dependent on interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement.4 5 The preemption rules governing the RLA
and the LMRA were so similar, that the Court applied the same
holding to both acts.4 6
The major result from the Hawaiian Airlines decision is that
the "minor dispute" classification will require a fact determination about whether the employment dispute is so intertwined
with the collective-bargaining agreement as to invoke the exclusive arbitral jurisdictional provisions of the RLA. However, employers are troubled by the idea that each case will involve a
separate fact determination to decide in which forum it should
be adjudicated. The time required for this type of fact finding
partially negates the efficiency effects of arbitration.
Some critics believe that the Hawaiian Airlines decision will
open the floodgates for employees, already. protected by collective-bargaining agreements, to bring multi-million dollar tort
claims under state and federal law.47 Further, this litigation explosion will undermine the purpose of the RLA, which is to provide stability and predictability in the vital transportation
industry.4 8 This also creates concern among airline and railroad
employers due to uncertainty about the ability to submit all
claims to the system boards for arbitration. The benefits of the
RLA's arbitration provisions will be severely impaired if employees are allowed to recharacterize disputes as claims existing
outside the collective-bargaining agreement or to add claims
outside the collective-bargaining agreement to their dispute
merely to escape arbitration.

44 Lingle v. Norge Div., Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (rejecting an employee's
claim in a NLRA case that the state claim prohibiting retaliation after filing a
workers' compensation claim was preempted by § 301 of the LMRA, the Court
decided that preemption by the LMRA occurs only when resolution of the dispute involves a direct interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement).
45 Campbell & Javits, supra note 6, at 364.
46 Roman, supra note 8, at 2C.
47 Brown & Aponte, supra note 5, at 370.
48

Id.
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RECONFIGURING IN LIGHT OF HAWAIIAN AIRLINES:
THE HIRRAS CASE

Before HawaiianAirlines was decided, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals addressed an RLA claim in which a railroad worker
brought a Title VII sex discrimination claim against the railroad,
alleging a hostile work environment. In that case, Hirras v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.,4 9 the plaintiff argued she should
be allowed to pursue her claim in court because the union
waived her individual rights in the collective-bargaining agreement. Ultimately, the case hinged on which standard for employment arbitration the Fifth Circuit would apply. The plaintiff
argued that Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.," ° one of the early
Supreme Court decisions dealing with arbitration in the union
setting, controlled.
In Gardner-Denver,the Court held that arbitration provisions
did not preclude a federal court discrimination suit that derived
its cause of action from Title VII.5 1 The Court determined that
if arbitration was an employee's only remedy for violations of his
or her civil rights, then a union and employer could act in concert to discriminate without reprieve.5 2 Because this violated the
congressional intent of the federal civil rights statutes, it was not
permitted by the Gardner-Denver Court. The Court said that
there were "different tracks for different rights ... statutory or
constitutional rights are to be enforced in the courts and contractual rights are to be settled through arbitration." 3
The Court in Gardner-Denverrelied on four factors when deciding to allow the union employee to pursue her grievance in
court. First, the Court believed that arbitrators had neither the
experience nor the authority to adjudicate claims involving Title
10 F.3d 1142 (5th Cir. 1994).
415 U.S. 36 (1974); see also United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg., 363
U.S. 564, 569 (1960). "The Steelworker Trilogy," as it is known, was the Supreme
Court's strong endorsement for the use of arbitration within the union setting
for claims arising under collective-bargaining agreements. But these decisions
have been limited, by many, as having application only to working relationships
within the context of a unionized workplace. However, the cases set the trend for
a liberal policy from the judicial branch favoring arbitration.
51 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974).
52 Id. at 52.
53 Charles J. Coleman & Gerald C. Coleman, Toward a New Paradigm of Labor
Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 36 (1995) (citing GardnerDenver, 415 U.S. at 49-50).
49
50
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VII. 4 Second, arbitral fact finding procedures were not believed to be sufficient and, as a result, deprived employees of
their federal rights under Title VII. 55 Third, arbitrators had no

responsibility to issue a written opinion. And, fourth, the court
was concerned about the union's control over the way that the
employee's grievance was presented to the arbitrator.56 The
general distrust of arbitration displayed by the Court reflected
the majority view at the time-that arbitration was not yet a perfect dispute resolution mechanism and, as a result, should be
57
used sparingly.
But the defense in Hirras argued a newer line of cases that
reflected a new found acceptance of arbitration. Since the Gardner-Denver decision, arbitration had made substantial advances
and had come to be regarded by the judiciary as a fully acceptable alternative to the courthouse. 58 This faith in arbitration was
also acknowledged by Congress when it passed the Federal Arbitration Act, which requires the judiciary to defer to a policy
favoring arbitration.59
As arbitration began to gain credibility in the legal community, the Supreme Court began to give it more support in the its
decisions. This is heartily apparent in Gilmer v. InterstateJohnson/Lane Corp., where the Court held that the contractual waiver
of the judicial forum was acceptable because there was no loss of
substantive rights in arbitration.6 " Another Fifth Circuit case, Alford v. Dean Whitter Reynolds, Inc., continued the policy espoused
in Gilmer, extending the enforcement of mandatory arbitration

54 Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 56-57.
55 Id. at 57-58.
56

Id. at 58.

57 See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme

Court's Preferencefor Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 653 (1996); see also
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
58 STEPHEN GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION,

211 (2d 1992).
59 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
60 500 U.S. 20 (1991). A 62-year-old stockbroker filed a suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act after being fired by his employer. The plaintiffs New
York Stock Exchange registration application stated that he agreed to arbitrate
any controversy arising out of the employment or termination of employment.
Id. The Court found this agreement to be enforceable and as a result, coupled
with the liberal policy favoring arbitration in the Federal Arbitration Act, prohibited the plaintiff from the judicial forum, requiring that the cause be heard in
arbitration instead. Id. at 21.
AND OTHER PROCESSES
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clauses to claims involving sexual harassment.6 ' Some critics argue that the Gilmer case virtually overturned the cautious approach to arbitration set forth in the Gardner-Denver case and
paved the way for stronger enforcement of arbitration agreements between employers and employees.62 However, this is not
necessarily true, since the cases were decided on different
policies.
The Hirras court was forced to choose between two radically
different interpretations of arbitration. The Gardner-Denvercase
attempted to check the pro-arbitration policies espoused by the
Court in the Steelworker Trilogy by deferring to a strong interest in the civil rights of employees and the ability to litigate
those claims in the federal forum. 6 ' Gilmer, on the other hand,
relied on the Federal Arbitration Act, which was passed by Congress to implement the use of alternative dispute resolution to
help alleviate a backlog of cases in the court system.6 4

61 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991) (The court followed the rationale behind
the Gilmerdecision to enforce a mandatory arbitration clause because of the similarities between the ADEA (dealt with in Gilmer) and the Title VII cause of action
in the Alford case).
62 See Evan J. Spelfogel, Legal and PracticalImplications of ADR and Arbitration in
Employment Disputes, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 247 (1993) (stating that several issues
are left unanswered in light of Gilmer, such as whether the Gilmerdecision will be
extended beyond stockbroker U-4 agreements to apply to employee handbooks,
manuals, and applications. The article also addresses the applicability of the Gilmer decision to the airline and railroad industries and how the courts are still
undecided about how far to extend this new strict enforcement of mandatory
arbitration clauses.). See also Arbitration: Suits Challenge Mandatory Arbitration as
Depriving Employees of Their Rights, DAILY LAB. REP., Mar. 3, 1995, at 3. (Daniel
Newland, an attorney with Kauff, McClain & McGuire in San Francisco, said
"What's ironic is that the reason why the Gilmer Court was able to apply the FAA
to the employment dispute was because the NASD agreement was not a contract
of employment, but a registration agreement, which included a provision to arbitrate employee disputes.").
63 J.Joseph Loewenberg, The Neutral and Public Interests in Resolving Disputes in
the United States, 13 COMP. LAB. L.J. 488, 490 (1992).
64 See Paul W. Cane & Nancy L. Abell, Employer Interest in Arbitration May be
Revived by Gilmer Case, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 7, 1991, at 33. The Gilmer court did not
specifically come to grips with the issue of the applicability of the FAA to the case,
but instead skirted around the issue with different judges applying the FAA in
different ways. Id. Two dissenting judges believed that the FAA did not apply to
any employment-related disputes between employers and employees in general.
Id. The majority did not address the issue because it was not filed in a timely
manner. Id. The majority relied primarily on the fact that the ADEA would not
be hindered by having its cause of action arbitrated, and the arbitration procedure was determined to be fair. Id.
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The Hirrascourt ultimately chose to rely on Gilmer and Alford,
instead of Gardner-Denver,finding there were no federal or Congressional policies which prohibited contracting discrimination
claims to arbitration. 65 The HirrasCourt followed the trend of
pro-arbitration cases and reaffirmed the validity of arbitration as
a successful and fair means of resolving disputes. The Court
also determined that the dispute could be characterized as a
"minor dispute" under the RLA and, as a result, was required to
be arbitrated.6 6
The Court cited four reasons why it would not follow the
plaintiff's argument that the Alexander line of cases was controlling: (1) this line of cases did not address the issue of whether
the RLA requires arbitration of an airline or railroad employee's
Title VII claim that arises out of the conditions experienced in
the workplace; (2) "there is no statutory barrier to submitting
[to the RLA arbitration boards'] questions involving the interpretation of statutes or case law;"'6 7 (3) the RLA guarantees the
right that the claim will be heard before [RLA arbitration
boards] ;68 and (4) the RLA (like the Federal Arbitration Act)
reflects a liberal policy favoring arbitration.6 9 For all of these
reasons, the Court upheld the district court's dismissal of Hirras' claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the RLA
preempted her grievance. w
The Court made its "minor dispute" determination through
facts that linked the grievance to the workplace and, applying
the definition produced in Burley, determined that the cause of
action was a "minor dispute" because it was "founded upon
some incident of the employment relationship.., independent
of those covered by the collective [bargaining] agreement, e.g.
claims on account of personal injuries. '"71
65

Hirras v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 10 F.3d 1142 (5th Cir. 1994).

66 Id. at 1149.
67 Id. at 1147 (citing Richmond, F. & P. R.R. v. Transp. Communications Int'l

Union, 973 F. 2d 276, 279 (4th Cir. 1992)).
- Hirras,10 F.3d at 1147 (citing 45 U.S.C. § 153 (j)(1994)); Burley, 325 U.S. at
736-38.
69 Hirras, 10 F.3d at 1147-48.
70 Id.
71 Id. (citing Burley, 325 U.S. at 723; Morales v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 894
F.2d 743, 745 (5th Cir. 1990)) (stating that claims "which grow out of the employment relationship can constitute 'minor disputes' under the Act, even when the
claims do not arise directly from the collective-bargaining agreement"); Calvert v.
Trans World Airlines, 959 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1992) (concluding that the RIA
preempted an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim).
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When Hirras appealed to the Supreme Court, the Hawaiian
Airlines decision had just been handed down, redefining the important definition of "minor dispute" for the RIA.72 As a result,
Hirras's case was remanded by the Supreme Court to the Fifth
Circuit for further consideration in light of the Hawaiian Airlines decision."h The Fifth Circuit did an about face inits ruling
in Hirras due to the Supreme Court's modification of "minor
dispute." The Hirrascourt stated that "[t]he terms of the [collective-bargaining agreement] at issue in this case are not relevant to the resolution of Hirras's claims because the collectivebargaining agreement contains no provision related to sexual
harassment, much less any provision that could be interpreted
to give Amtrak the right to accommodate sexual harassment or
Hirras the right to work in a non-hostile environment."74
In the Hirras court's first ruling, the court mentioned in a
footnote that the issue was not whether the RLA preempts Title
VII, but rather how to accommodate the interests that underlie
the RLA and Title VII. 75 The court was placed in a difficult position because both the arbitral provisions of the RLA and statutory civil right protections have valid justifications, but their
policies seem to collide head on. Title VII was passed to specifically protect individual employee rights. By allowing the employer to manipulate the means by which employees could bring
their civil rights claims, the employer could theoretically hinder
the fairness of the adjudication.
Additionally, the court realized that the federal government is
concerned with protecting employees who are perceived to be
in an unequal bargaining position in the workplace. Critics
quickly point out the irony that the government tells employees
how concerned it is with their civil rights, but then turns around
and allows the employer to proscribe the forum in which the
employee must have his dispute heard.7 6
But as this happens, the effectiveness of the RLA's arbitration
provisions deteriorate because employers cannot rely on the sysHawaiian Airlines v. Norris, 114 S. Ct. 2339 (1994).
Hirras, 10 F.3d at 1142.
74 44 F.3d 278, 283-84 (5th Cir. 1995).
75 Court Says Amtrak Employee Must Pursue Sex Harassment Claim Under Railway
Labor Act, DAILY LAB. REP., Jan. 20, 1994, at D6 (citing Hirras v. National R.R.
Passenger Corp., 10 F.3d 1142 (5th Cir. 1994)).
76 See, e.g., Joseph Z. Fleming, Grievances and Arbitration for the Organized Employer, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: BASIC EMPLOYMENT & LAB. L. IN DEPTH,July 8,
1996, at 437, 443 ("individual rights are eclipsing collective rights").
72

73
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tem boards to handle all cases. Courts are faced with protecting
individual rights without destroying the arbitration system.77
Apparently between these two competing policies, the Hawaiian Airlines decision announced a new preference for an employee's right to a judicial forum that courts, like the one that
decided Hirras,are required to follow. This creates a dangerous
trend because it invites interruption to the airline industry by
submitting the airlines to "costly, protracted lawsuits and to inconsistent and often contradictory obligations."7 8

The new

trend in HawaiianAirlines provides airline employees the opportunity to bypass the arbitral mechanisms of the RLA and reap
virtually unlimited tort damages by labeling their claims as
something other than a breach of contract, even if the same
facts would support that the claim should be preempted.79
VI.

CONTINUED CHANGE: THE FELT CASE

Another example of the corrosion of the RLA's arbitration
provisions occurred in the recent case of Felt v. Atchinson, Topeka
& Santa Fe Railway Co."° In Felt, the Ninth Circuit made the first
post-HawaiianAirlines RLA mandatory arbitration ruling, deciding that Title VII claims were not required to be subjected to the
8 1 The Felt case involved a railarbitral mechanisms of the RLA.
road clerical employee who was laid off in 1983 after working at
the railroad for twelve years.8 2 As part of his membership into
the union, Felt was given protective pay during the periods he
was not employed on the condition that he would be able to
work temporary assignments as they became available. A position became available for Felt, but it required him to work on
Saturdays, which was forbidden by his religion. Instead, Felt
worked at the position on a temporary basis, switching with
other employees to work for him on Saturdays. When the position became available permanently, Felt was forced to turn it
down because of his religious beliefs. As a result, Felt lost both
his protected pay and his severance pay when his office in Los
Angeles was closed in 1987.
Initially, the district court properly dismissed the claim because it fell under the previous definition of "minor dispute,"
77 Coleman & Coleman, supra note 53, at 58.
78

Brown & Aponte, supra note 5, at 378.

79 Id.
80 60 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1995).
81 Id.
82

Id. at 1418.
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and was, therefore, preempted by the RLA. 83 However, in light
of the HawaiianAirlines decision, the court was forced to reconsider whether Felt's cause of action constituted a "minor
dispute."84
The court held that Title VII rights existed independently of
Felt's collective-bargaining agreement.85 As a result, they did
not fall under the Hawaiian Airlines definition of "minor dispute," although it would have fallen under the definition espoused in Burley and Consolidated Rail.86 The court also relied
on its previous ruling in PrudentialIns. Co. v. Lai, in which the
court held that a Title VII plaintiff may be required to arbitrate
her claims only if "she [or he] has knowingly agreed to submit
such claims to arbitration."87
The Lai case brought a great deal of attention to the concept
of a "knowing waiver" of the right to a judicial forum, without
much guidance. Knowing waivers become important because if
airline employers realize that certain causes of action are able to
escape the arbitral provisions of the RLA, then mandatory arbitration agreements can be used to recapture these types of
claims. But these types of agreements would likely only be enforceable upon evidence of a knowing waiver on the part of the
employee.88
VII.

INCONSISTENT RESULTS: THE BATES CASE

Another departure from the pro-arbitration policies of the
RLA took place in the Second Circuit case of Bates v. Long Island
Railroad, Co.89 In Bates, former employees of Long Island Railroad brought action against their employer under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 for wrongful termination because of their
respective disabilities, without attempting to reasonably accom83

Id.

84 Id.
85

Id. at 1419-20.

Id.
Id. (citing Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994))
("Congress intended there to be at least a knowing agreement to arbitrate employment disputes before an employee may be deemed to have waived the comprehensive statutory rights, remedies, and procedural protections prescribed in
Title VII"); see also Michael A. Faillace, Recent Developments Under Title VII and Section 1981, 547 PLI/LIT. 331, 392 (1996) (demonstrating that employees cannot
be deemed to have waived their statutory fights under Title VII unless there is a
knowing agreement to arbitrate such employee disputes).
88 See discussion Part IX, A infra.
89 Bates v. Long Island R.R., 997 F.2d 1028 (2nd Cir. 1993).
86
87
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modate them.9 0 The primary issue on appeal was whether the
district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case, or
whether the case was preempted under the definition of "minor
dispute" under the RA.9 1
The court in Bates determined that Gilmer relied on the Federal Arbitration Act's liberal policy favoring arbitration when determining that Gilmer's statutory civil rights claim was subject to
arbitration.9 2 However, the Second Circuit distinguished this
case from Gilmer by explaining that Gilmer was decided under
the Federal Arbitration Act, and the Federal Arbitration Act specifically excludes railroad and airline employees, such as the employees in Bates.9 3 The court further distinguished the two cases
a collective-bargaining agreeby pointing out that Bates involved
94
ment, while Gilmer did not.
The Bates court relied on the Gardner-Denverline of cases to
hold that the arbitral forum may be inappropriate in some instances, such as this case, to protect the rights of the employees.9 5 This ruling was made in spite of the fact that there were
portions of the plaintiff's allegations that could require the interpretation or application of the collective-bargaining agreement in order for the dispute to be properly resolved.9 6 Thus,
Bates rekindled the dying flames of Alexander that seemed to
have been all but extinguished by Gilmer and its progeny. More
directly than the Hawaiian Airlines decision, the Bates decision
demonstrates a willingness by some courts to put the rights of
individuals above the Congressional intent and purpose behind
the RLA. Bates reasserts the importance of employee rights and
injects a volatile variable into the mix, and makes it difficult for
employers to gauge how the courts stand on RLA preemption of
minor disputes, and uncertain whether to rely on the RLA as an
effective tool for arbitration.
at
91 Id. at
92 Id. at
93 Id. at
90 Id.

1030.
1034.
1033-34.
1034.

94 Id.

95 Id. at 1033-34 (citing Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S.
728, 735 (1981)) ("[W]hen an employee's statutory civil rights have been violated, arbitration should not be the sole avenue of protection, unless Congress
has so specified."); Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 53-54, 59-60 (1974) ("[A]rbitration
is an inappropriate forum for the final resolution of civil rights claims.").
96 Charles S. Mishkind & Louise B. Wright, Update on Recent Trends in the Law:
After-Acquired Evidence, FraudulentJoinder, and Alternative Dispute Resolution, EMPLOYEE REL. L.J., Summer 1994, at 115.
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VIII.

SOLUTIONS TO RECAPTURE DISPUTES TO
ARBITRATION

Decisions such as HawaiianAirlines, Burley, and Hirrascreate
uncertainty for airline employers about the ability of the RLA
arbitration procedures to dispose of all employee disputes. As a
result, employers are forced to turn to alternatives in hopes of
recapturing any employee disputes that courts may allow to escape the RLA. Three possible alternatives for employers include (1) incorporating federal civil rights into the collectivebargaining agreement, (2) using unwritten customs and procedures to capture claims, and (3) implementing mandatory arbitration agreements to cover any claims that might be outside the
jurisdiction of the RLA.
A.

INCORPORATING FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES INTO THE

COLLECTIVE-BARGAINING AGREEMENT

In Felt, the collective-bargaining agreement stated that work
rules would be applied in compliance with federal statutes, but
there was no specific agreement in the collective-bargaining
agreement to arbitrate Title VII disputes.97 It seemed that the
court might have forced Felt to arbitrate his claims if the collective-bargaining agreement had specifically discussed civil rights
statutes (perhaps by including them in their entirety) and ordered that such claims should be arbitrated under the provisions of the agreement. Employers could possibly rein in these
claims by incorporating federal civil rights statutes into the collective-bargaining agreements, making claims brought under
their theories subject to the mandatory arbitration provisions of
the RLA.
First, some critics might argue that courts are already distraught at the fate of employees' rights at the hands of
mandatory arbitration clauses, and that incorporation of the
civil rights statutes into the agreements will not be any different.
However, when civil right statutes are integrated into the collective-bargaining agreement, the employee becomes aware of the
specific rights that will be subject to the arbitration provisions of
the RLA. When the employee agrees to the collective-bargaining agreement, this becomes a waiver of the judicial forum, as
long as the employee agrees to the collective-bargaining agreement without duress and with full knowledge of the facts and
97 Felt v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 60 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1995).
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consequences of being relegated to an arbitral forum for disputes.98 Employers would have to demonstrate that the risks associated with waiving a judicial forum were explained to the
employee and that the employee determined he would be satisfied resolving disputes through arbitration.99 While it is uncertain whether the use of the collective-bargaining agreement in
this manner will meet the knowing waiver test required by Lai, it
will likely suffice since there will be direct evidence that the employee was shown the rights and kinds of claims that would be
mandated when signing the collective-bargaining agreement.
Second, incorporation of civil rights statutes into an agreement shows good faith on the part of the employer and indicates a desire for employees and employers at all levels to be
aware of the law and to abide by it. While the employees and
employer are obviously bound by federal law, the regulations
take on a special meaning when they become part of the official
company policy. But the employer may have difficulty actually
proving the degree of knowledge an employee had, especially if
a union acts as the employee's agent.
B.

A

BACKDOOR FOR RECAPTURING CLAIMS:

UNWRITTEN

CUSTOMS AND PROCEDURES

Hawaiian Airlines, as well as Burley, discussed that there are
certain unwritten customs and procedures that could be categorized as minor disputes under the RIA. 1°0 This portion of the
Hawaiian Airlines decision acts as a conduit, capturing a wide
range of claims arising out of the workplace and, in effect, reinstating the
basic language of Burley, albeit through different
10 1
means.
Unwritten customs can be implemented to expand the scope2
10
of RLA preemption into the arena of federal civil rights.
When employees bring claims, such as those under Title VII and
the ADA, employers could capture the claim under the arbitra-

Il

See Ninth CircuitImposes Knowing Waiverfor Mandatory Arbitrationof Sexual Har-

assment Claims, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1996).
99 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 61 (1995).
100Hawaiian Airlines v. Norris, 114 S. Ct. 2239 (citing RLEA v. Norfolk & W.,
833 F.2d 700, 704-05 (7th Cir. 1987) ("[1]t is common practice to omit from
written [RLA] agreements non-essential practices that are acceptable to both parties." The dispute is "minor" if it arises from "implied" job conditions.)); Elgin,
Joliet &E. Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945).
101Panken et al., supra note 7, at 681.
102 Schoolman, supra note 20, at 727.
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tion provisions of the RLA by demonstrating the claim's association to the workplace. Because most of these claims occur in the
workplace setting and are in violation of unwritten "norms" of
accepted behavior (such as discrimination), companies could
argue that these claims require arbitration.
However, because federal statutory rights are involved, courts
have been reluctant to immediately deny plaintiffs access to the
judicial forum without evidence that a knowing waiver took
place, either by the individual or within the employment contract resulting from collective bargaining.1 "3 Still, the unwritten
norms of the workplace is one more method by which disputes
could be characterized as within the employment context and
brought under the arbitral provisions of the RLA.
C.

1.

MANDATORY ARBITRATION

The Benefits of Arbitration in the Workplace

The most promising method of recapturing claims, which
courts deem outside the jurisdiction of the RLA, appears to be
through the use of mandatory arbitration agreements. This type
of commercial arbitration is different from the system board
form of arbitration used in the RLA, because in the commercial
form, the claimant conducts his or her own representation
before the arbitrator. 0 4 The individual in commercial arbitration may assert individual statutory rights in arbitration, free
from concerns that may accompany union representation in the
collective-bargaining context. 5 This would eliminate some of
the concerns courts have voiced about the use of RLA arbitration for civil rights." 6
The arguments favoring arbitration are overwhelming. In
1993, the accounting firm of Deloitte & Touche conducted a
survey of 246 corporate attorneys from Fortune 1000 companies,
which found that of the firms that had used arbitration, sixtyseven percent found a savings over the expense that would have
been incurred in litigation.1 °7 The firms that saved by using arbitration reported savings between eleven and fifty percent over
103

Id.

104

Douglas E. Abrams, Arbitrability in Recent Federal Civil Rights Legislation: The

Need for Amendment, 26 CONN. L. REV. 521, 577 (1994).
105

Id.

Panken et al., supra note 7.
Wojcik, ADR Savings Depend on Nature of the Dispute, Bus. INs., Sept.
13, 1993, at 1.
106

107 Joanne
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litigation. 10 8 By effectively using mandatory arbitration to reduce legal expenses and having all disputes settled through
some sort of arbitration (either RLA or otherwise), an airline
can price its product more competitively, resulting in lower
ticket prices for consumers.
Unions have been implementing mandatory arbitration for
decades and are strong supporters of its use.' 0 9 The Air Line
Pilots Association (ALPA) is a heavy user of mandatory arbitration, with between 300 and 500 grievances submitted to binding
arbitration each year."o The ALPA uses arbitration for the same
reasons that the use of arbitration has increased nationwide:
time and cost savings over expenses normally associated with
protracted litigation.1 1 ' In addition to these two primary benefits, arbitration provides several other benefits to airlines.
One benefit is that the arbitration hearing is private, and the
arbitrator's award is usually confidential, unless the parties
agree otherwise. 1 12 This helps employers keep settlement
figures and statistics confidential from the general public. The
concern of employers is that if certain individuals were to find
out about settlements given to dismiss employee suits or judgments received at trial, it might demonstrate that the employer
is vulnerable, prompting certain employees to file similar suits
in hopes of cashing in on a large settlement or jury award.
Another benefit to the employers is that today's arbitrators
are usually individuals who understand both the law and the dynamics of the workplace. 1 3 Often times, a judge may not have
had any experience within the workplace, especially one as de108 Harry N. Mazadorrian, Alternative Dispute Resolution, Widespread Disgust with
CivilJustice is Boon to ADR, Industry-Specific Protocols Gain Acceptance, CORP. LEGAL
TIMES, Apr. 1994, at 17.
109

Employers Reluctant to Embrace Mandatory Arbitration, Survey Finds, DAILY LAB.

REP., Apr. 30, 1992, at A14.

110 Id. See also Corporate Legal Times Roundtable, supra note 3, at 34 (Andrew
Steinberg, general counsel of American Airlines, stating that he "firmly believes
that alternative dispute resolution is the wave of the future and the only acceptable means of resolving the huge number of employment claims out there").
111 Michele L. Giovagnol, Comment, To Be or Not to Be?: Recent Resistance to
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements in the Employment Arena, 64 UMKC L. REv. 547,
582 (1994); but see Arthur S. Hayes & Ann Hagedorn, Arbitration in Commercial
Cases Found to Save Money, Not Time, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 1990, at B10 (stating that
arbitration does not necessarily speed up the process of resolving disputes).
112 Thomasj. Piskorski & David B. Ross, Editorial, EMPLOYEE REL. L.J., Autumn
1993, at 209.
113 See Coleman & Coleman, supra note 53, at 62-63.
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manding and safety intensive as the airline industry.'14 As a result, the judge most likely will be unknowledgeable as to some of
the complexities of the job and may inadvertently take a proemployee slant in deciding the case.' 15 In contrast, an arbitrator
will often have experience in the workplace, and, possibly, in the
airline industry itself. With knowledge of both sides of the equation, arbitrators are better suited to reach an acceptable compromise that will benefit both employee and employer.
Another advantage an arbitrator has over a judge is that 1an16
arbitrator often only decides cases within a particular field.
Arbitrators will usually be very experienced in a particular area
of the law because they have decided several similar types of
cases. This is different from judges, whose dockets usually involve a multitude of cases spanning the legal spectrum." 7 A
judge may not have the high degree of experience deciding
matters in the complicated area of employment law, particularly
airline employment law with its mixed union and non-union
make-up. Employment law is a very specialized, technical field
that is often times difficult to grasp. A judge having little or no
experience with employment cases may not follow the requirements of the law in a particular case, but instead does what he or
she feels is right, without taking into proper consideration the
intent of Congress.
A final advantage an arbitrator has over a judge is that, at the
state level, where judges are elected, a judge may feel pressure
14 Garry G. Mathiason & Pavneet S. Uppal, Evaluating and Using Employer-Initiated Arbitration Policies and Agreements: Preparing the Workplace for the Twenty-First
Century, 1994 ABA/ALI COURSE OF STUDY: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION & CIv.
RTS. ACTIONS IN FED. AND ST. CTS. 875, 879; see also Corporate Legal Times
Roundtable, supra note 3, at 34 (Andrew Steinberg, general counsel of American
Airlines, stating that "airline safety is our paramount goal, [and] we have a fairly
rigorous medical examination process that results in disqualifying people from
safety-sensitive positions-whether it's the pilots, flight attendants or even
ground service personnel coming into contact with aircraft. That has resulted in
a large number of claims under the ADA. We have opposed those cases vigorously because it is really part of our safety program.").
115 Supreme Court Allows Fired Worker to Sue Airline in State Court, AVIATION DAILY,
June 21, 1994, at 463 (reporting that the Air Transport Association was displeased
with a recent Supreme Court case allowing an employee to escape the arbitral
provisions of the RLA and sue in state court, and stating "[w]e had hoped the
court would be more sensitive to the burdens placed on carriers by the multitude
of state laws addressing discharge issues and the need for uniformity in employment relationships in the aviation and rail industries").
116 Mathiason & Uppal, supra note 114, at 879.
117 Mary L. Stow & Harold J. Spoeth, Examining an Anthology: Does the Judicial
Monster Eat Chaff?, 75 JUDICATURE 294, 337 (1992).
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from employment rights groups or corporations that the judge's
handling of a particular case may affect the judge's prospects for
reelection.1 18 Such pressure may cause ajudge to ignore the law
and rule in a manner that best serves his re-election needs. With
arbitration, the arbitrator has no such pressure because he is
usually picked through the consent of both parties. It is in the
arbitrator's best interest to be fair, because if he clearly favors
one side over the other, it could affect his reputation within the
legal community as an acceptable arbitrator.
Also, an arbitrator can be a better alternative than a jury trial
because juries may hold biases that invalidate decisions. A majority of jurors are employees rather than employers, and as a
result, will be more inclined to align themselves with the employee's position in a dispute. Given an opportunity through
jury duty to rectify any perceived inequities between worker and
boss, jurors will often penalize what they believe to be "deep
pockets" of the employer.' 19
Finally, an arbitration decision is very difficult to appeal and
can only be vacated on very narrow grounds. 120 This is beneficial in two ways. First, the finality of the decision is not postponed while the lawyers battle through round after round of
appeals until all appeals are exhausted. The decision is virtually
irrefutable, allowing both sides to put the dispute behind them
and go on with their lives, rather than suffer a prolonged appeal
process that could drag on for years. Second, this provides both
parties with financial savings which otherwise would have been
applied to attorneys' fees as the dispute waged on through the
various appeals.
The above benefits of commercial arbitration appear to provide an adequate solution, allowing the employer to recapture
employment disputes which courts are allowing to escape the
arbitration provisions of the RLA.
2.

Concerns that Mandatory Arbitration Debases Individual Rights

In some cases, however, courts have been reluctant to enforce
mandatory arbitration clauses that restrict potential plaintiffs
from the judicial forum because individual civil liberties are in118

Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraintand Liberty injudicialEthics, 9

GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1088 (1996).
119

Review Outlook: Capping the Courts, Editorial, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1985 at

A30.
120

Mathiason & Uppal, supra note 114, at 880.
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volved-the same reasons courts have allowed some employee
12 1
disputes to be pursued outside the framework of the RLA.
This is especially true in cases where statutory claims, such as
Title VII or the ADA, are the employees' cause of action. 122 The
competing policies surrounding arbitration make deciding
1 23
which interests are more important difficult for courts.
While many labor and employment advocacy groups support
the use of arbitration as a quick and efficient method of dispute
resolution, many of the same groups condemn the use of
mandatory arbitration clauses because the groups think it eliminates the employees' choice of forum. 124 These groups believe
employees should possess a choice of judicial forum if the em125
ployee decides it will be more fair for one reason or another.
The importance placed on this choice is not an endorsement or
condemnation of one system or another, but merely an affirmation of allowing the employee, normally perceived to be in an
121 Margaret A. Jacobs, Rulings Show Judges are Growing Skeptical of Mandatory
Arbitration, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 1994, at B2.
122 See EEOC v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic, 63 U.S.L.W. 2733 (S.D. Tex.
1995). The defendant was found to be using a mandatory arbitration policy to
retaliate against employees in violation of Title VII. The court determined that
River Oaks Imaging was barred from implementing a policy that required employees to submit all claims to alternative dispute resolution as a condition of
employment. Id. This case, however, does not necessarily set a precedent against
mandatory arbitration, but rather the use of mandatory arbitration clauses as a
retaliatory measure against employees. Id. As a result, the enforcement of
mandatory arbitration clauses still remains largely undecided in the employment
context. Id. This broad challenge to mandatory binding arbitration agreements
demonstrates the current opposition arising regarding the ADR process. Giovagnoli, supra note Ill, at 571.
123 See generally Richard C. Reuben, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses Under Fire,
A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 58.
124 The EEOC issued a policy condemning the use of mandatory arbitration
because it "shut[s] off the employee's access to the EEOC" which was deemed to
be "unfair". David E. Rovella, FEOC Says No to Forced Arbitration, But Policy May
Backfire by Increasing the Agency's Backing, NAT'L LJ., June 5, 1995, at BI. See also
Dunlop Commission: Panel Strongly Endorses the Use of ADR, But Opposes Mandatory
Arbitration,DAILY LAB. REP., Jan. 10, 1995, at D4. The Dunlop Commission, a tenmember panel headed by former Secretary of Labor John Dunlop, was charged
with examining the best methods of dealing with workplace disputes. Id. The
panel's conclusion was that arbitration and alternative dispute resolution are efficient methods of resolving workplace disputes, but that mandatory arbitration
goes too far because it strips employees of the right to choose in which forum
they would like to have the dispute decided. Id. The panel apparently believes
the right to a courtroom trial is a natural right belonging to the employee that
can only be extinguished through a knowing waiver. Id.
125 See Margaret A. Jacobs, Employers' Required Arbitration of Job-Claims Stirs Criticism, WALL ST. J., June 22, 1994, at B5.
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unequal bargaining position with the employer, to wield some
power by deciding the forum for the dispute.126 The EEOC
states that the use of mandatory arbitration as a condition of
employment is unfair because it severely limits employee access
to the benefits of the agency. 27 Some believe that this stance by
the EEOC indicates that they are willing to sue any employer
implementing a mandatory arbitration policy on behalf of the
employee. 128 While the EEOC has begun to implement this new
anti-mandatory arbitration policy, it has yet to apply it to the
railroad and airline industries. The EEOC has relied on the
Gardner-Denver line of cases when making its point in court,
which is similar to the arguments made by the plaintiff in Hirras
v. Amtrak, and discrediting the Gilmer line of cases as robbing
employees of their judicial rights.1 29 The EEOC has argued,
however, that, with civil rights statutes, Congress did not intend
for discrimination claims to be dismissed "if an employee fails to
pursue arbitration. 1 0
The EEOC is not the only governmental group that seems to
be concerned with mandatory arbitration. Federal agencies
such as the General Accounting Office and the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs are presently exploring possibilities and conducting studies which should put the validity
and fairness of mandatory arbitration clauses in doubt. 31 These
organizations' public anti-mandatory arbitration stance adds to
the uncertainty of using mandatory arbitration, which has an inhibiting effect on employers who are hesitant to adopt such
clauses for fear of the consequences.
3. JudicialAcceptance of Mandatory Arbitration
Recent decisions like Gilmer and its progeny have paved the
way for the use of mandatory arbitration clauses by employers
through endorsements of its use. In Gilmer, the Court reversed
the distrust of arbitration in Gardner-Denverand its progeny, relyAbrams, supra note 104, at 561.
Rovella, supra note 124, at B1.
128 Id.
129 EEOCArgues That Sex, Disability Claims Are Not Subject to Mandatory Arbitration,
DAILY LAB. RP., July 21, 1994, at D5.
130 Id. (stressing that Congress did not mean that arbitration was the only
method by which an agrieved employee could pursue a discrimination cause of
action).
131 David B. Barclay & William A. Carmell, Benefits of a Resolution-Centered ADR
Program Companies Must Plan Process with Gilmer Decision in Mind, CoRP. LEGAL
TIMES, Dec. 1994, at 24 (Labor and Employment Section).
126
127
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ing instead on the Federal Arbitration Act and its liberal policy
favoring arbitration.' 3 2 Since Gilmer, many employers have begun to enforce mandatory arbitration policies against their
employees.

1 33

In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,' 34 the
Supreme Court decided that statutory rights may be the subject
of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act: "By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim,
a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; [instead,] it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,
'3
rather than a judicial, forum.'

5

Also spurring an increased use of mandatory arbitration
clauses are the civil rights statutes, such as Title VII, the ADA,
the Family and Medical Leave Act, and others which contain language reflecting a liberal policy towards the use of arbitration.
For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 encourages arbitration
when it states: "Where appropriate and to the extent authorized
by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact-finding, mini-trials and arbitration is encouraged to
resolve disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal
laws amended by this title."
With so many competing variables, it becomes increasingly urgent that employers in the airline industry know the boundaries
of applying mandatory arbitration so that this effective alternative can retain its value. Despite this apparent endorsement by
the judiciary and Congress, the enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses is a battle that is still being waged.
4.

CongressionalIntent ConcerningArbitration in Civil Rights
Statutes

Some critics attempt to overcome the pro-arbitration policy
written into the civil rights statutes by arguing that the legislative
history of both the new Civil Rights Act and the ADA indicates
that the use of ADR is supposed to "supplement rather than sup132 See Coleman & Coleman, supra note 53, at 52. See also supra notes 60-71 and
accompanying text.
133 Stuart H. Bompey & Andrea H. Stempel, Four Years Later: A Look at Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims After Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Co., 21 EMPLOYMENT REL. L.J. 21 (1995).
134 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
135 Id.
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plant remedies provided for in the new statutes."1"6 As an example, critics often cite Senator Dole's remarks made during the
debate over the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the
arbitration provisions therein which encouraged arbitration.
Senator Dole stated that arbitration should be used only "where
the parties knowingly and voluntarily elect to use these methods. ' 137 This statement, however, seems to allow mandatory ar-

bitration in cases where consent to such a provision is given
knowingly by the employee. An employee can voluntarily and
knowingly submit him or herself to a mandatory arbitration provision in an employment contract and will still be acting in the
spirit of Senator Dole's comments.
Also worth noting is Representative Edward's statement that
the arbitration provision in the Civil Rights Act is
intended to be consistent with decisions such as Alexander v.
Gardner-DenverCo., ... which protects employees from being re-

quired to agree in advance to arbitrate disputes under Title VII
and to refrain from exercising their right to seek relief under
Title VII itself ... [n]o approval whatsoever is intended of the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Gilber [sic] v. InterstateJohnson
Lane Corp.... or any application or extension of it to Title VII.13 s

This statement condemning the policies behind the Gilmer case
is clear-cut and seems to leave no room for misinterpretation.
However, when there is unambiguous language in a statute that
conflicts with subsequent legislative history, the unambiguous
language of the statute will be found controlling by the
courts.1 "9 Despite the legislative intent of Representative Edwards, the arbitration provisions in the civil rights statutes specifically allow employers and employees to execute contracts that
bind them to arbitration in all disputes, including those disputes
involving federal civil rights.
CongressionalAttempts to Prohibit Mandatory Arbitration

5.

Some members of Congress have acknowledged that the federal statutes' liberal policy towards arbitration may permit
mandatory arbitration clauses as a condition of employment and
have attempted to counter this by introducing two bills in the
Panken et al., supra note 7, at 691.
137 CONG. REc. 15472-01, 15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of
Sen. Dole).
138 137 CONG. Ruc. H9505-01, H9530 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of
Rep. Edwards).
139 See Panken et al., supra note 7, at 690.
136
137
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House and the Senate prohibiting mandatory arbitration. In
the House, three representatives, Representative Patricia
Schroeder (D-Colo.), Representative Edward Markey (D-Mass.),
and Representative Marjorie Margolies-Mezvinsky (D-Pa.), have
sponsored a bill which would reverse the landmark case of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. by prohibiting any anti-discrimination law "to be overridden by contract, other federal
statutes of general applicability, or by any other means."' 4 ° The
bill is intended to close the loophole opened by Gilmer that Representative Schroeder says allowed employees to "give up rights
at the time of hire." '4 1 The bill arose out of concerns about the
use of mandatory arbitration clauses in the securities industry,
but would apply to all employers that are regulated by federal
14 2
anti-discrimination laws.

A similar bill was introduced in the Senate by Senator Russell
Feingold (D-Wis.).' 43 Referring to the Supreme Court's Gilmer decision, Senator Feingold told the Senate floor, "Employers
can tell current and prospective employees, 'if you want to work
for us, you'll have to check your rights at the door.' This practice must be stopped now." '44 This legislation would specifically
amend several federal anti-discrimination laws, including Title
VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the
ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to prohibit mandatory
arbitration of claims.145 Neither bill would prohibit employees
from voluntarily submitting to arbitration clauses with their
employers. "'
Senator Feingold's concern is that mandatory use of arbitration policies by employers will erode the individual liberties of
citizens who use the courts to secure their right to equal opportunity for employment. 14 7 The flaw is this argument is that it
assumes arbitration will be an inadequate forum to protect employee rights. 48 The evidence proves otherwise. Arbitration
has been proven to be an adequate alternative to the judicial
House Democrats Introduce Bill to Bar Compulsory Arbitration of Bias Claims,
REP., Aug. 18, 1994, at D4.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143Senate Bill Bars Mandatory EEO Arbitration, DAILY LAB. REP., Aug. 22, 1994, at
D20.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Panken et al., supra note 7, at 681.
148 Id. at 687.
140

DAILY LAB.
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forum, even superior in some ways such as the time it takes to
complete and the cost involved. Therefore, the argument that
an employee is being deprived of his civil rights simply because
he is being required to argue in arbitration is without merit. In
the case of Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 4 ' the
Supreme Court explained its belief in the fairness of arbitration,
stating that
the streamlined procedures of arbitration do not entail any consequential restriction on substantive rights ...there is no reason

to assume at the outset that arbitrators will not follow the law;
although the judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is
limited, such review is sufficient to ensure
that arbitrators comply
150
with the requirements of the statute.
Arbitration will not be struck down by the courts simply because
of an amorphous suspicion that arbitration
will be somehow un5
able to protect the rights of workers.1 '
6.

Interest Groups Lobby to Ban Mandatory Arbitration

Some attorneys have also expressed a strong disapproval of
mandatory arbitration clauses because of the perceived sacrifice
of employee rights accompanying such a provision. For instance, two recent cases in San Francisco are challenging the
fairness of mandatory arbitration. 152 Cliff Palefsky, a partner
with McGuinn, Hillsman & Palefsky, represents the plaintiff in
one of the cases. He stated that mandatory arbitration programs are being instigated because defendants "get better re15 Palefsky believes that
sults from arbitrators than from jurors.""
mandatory arbitration is akin to stealing people's rights because
"[a]rbitration is not ajustice system," but an attempt at a quick
finality.'

54

Other attorneys involved in the arbitration process are quick
to disagree, citing new rules proposed by the American Arbitration Association that will mirror a court's approach to applying
the law. Kirby Wilcox, a partner at San Francisco's Morrison &
149482 U.S.
150

220, 232 (1987).

Id.

151 STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET. AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
TION, AND OTHER PROCESSEs

NEGOTIATION, MEDIA-

211 (1992).

152 Arbitration: Suits Challenge Mandatory Arbitration as Depriving Employees of
Their Rights, DAILY LAB. REP., Mar. 3, 1995, at D28.
153 Id.
154 Id.
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Foester, believes that while arbitration is an expedited mecha1 55
nism, the parties "don't leave [their] rights at the door."'
The criticism of these rules, which offer plaintiffs more protections than would be afforded in the judicial forum, is that
arbitration will become an alternative court system which will
soon suffer from the same problems that required alternative
dispute resolution in the first place.' 56 It is important that arbitration be a form of expedited adjudication of disputes and not
become too bogged down in time delay aspects, thus eliminating the usefulness of the process. On the other hand, it is also
important that arbitration does not become so streamlined that
the parties lose their rights in an effort to resolve the dispute as
quickly as possible. In light of the courts' continuing endorsement of mandatory arbitration of employment claims and the
advantages associated with it, both employers and employees
have good reason to pursue opportunities to arbitrate, rather
7
15
than litigate, their claims.

IX.

RATIONALE FOR USING MANDATORY ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS TO SUPPLEMENT THE RLA

Many employers have been unwilling to adopt mandatory arbitration clauses for use in employment contracts because the
law is in a state of flux. It is difficult for employers to implement
an arbitration program in the workplace on a long-term basis
when the program's validity may be called into doubt. Some
employers have expressed that they want the law to be more settled with regards to alternative
dispute resolution and the bene15
fits to be more apparent.

1

Id.
Ronald T. Y. Moon, Visions of a New Legal System: Could There Be a Legal
System that Better Incorporates the Strengths of ADR and Existing Legal Institutions?, 15
REv. LITIG. 475, 483 (1996).
157Sean T. Quinn, Courts Uphold Employment Arbitration Clauses, NAT'L L.J., Nov.
18, 1996, at D2.
158 Employers Reluctant to Embrace Mandatory Arbitration, Survey Finds, DAmLY LAB.
REP., Apr. 30, 1992, at A14. Gary Green, the Air Line Pilot Association's counsel,
states that he is confident that the "tension arising out of the individual statutory
rights and collective contractual rights is too great for the Supreme Court to
impose mandatory arbitration." Id. Green believes that the Supreme Court will
uphold the arbitration agreements in almost all instances, but when faced with
federal civil rights, the Court will not uphold the agreements. Id. He believes
that when contractual rights are imposed on the majority, the Supreme Court
will be concerned about the individual's choice of forum being forfeited without
due process. As a result, most mandatory arbitration clauses will be struck down.
Id. But see Machson & Monteleone, supra note 1, at 34. Andrew Steinberg, the
155

156
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Other employers point out that the flexibility of the judicial
system works to the employers' benefit because it persuades employees to settle out of fear that litigation could be very expensive and drag on for years. These employers realize that time
and money are on their side and choose not to give up these
bargaining chips by adopting arbitration procedures. But by using arbitration, businesses can characterize and plan for the
losses attributable to disputes by employees, aiding in the longterm planning and economic forecasts.
A.

KNOWING WAIVER

Concerns that mandatory arbitration will be forced on employees are problematic in that the Supreme Court will not actually be "imposing" mandatory arbitration. Rather, the
employees would be signing a contract as they choose whether
or not to work under the conditions present in the employment
contract. This is analogous to the type of health plan a company
might have. If a potential employee finds out in the interview
process that the health plan is not comprehensive and is subsequently offered a job, he does not have to accept the job. The
decision then becomes one of deciding between the job or a
better health plan. Similarly, the employee in the airline industry could be given a choice at employment whether to accept
the policy of resolving employee disputes through arbitration. A
mandatory arbitration provision in a contract can be enforced if
all of the required elements of contract formation are present
such as consideration, mutuality of performance, etc., and there
is no evidence of fraud, disproportionate bargaining capacity between parties, or unconscionability. 159 The courts, therefore,
are not imposing anything, but are only upholding contracts
that the employees or their agents (the union) have entered
into. The application of a mandatory arbitration provision as a
condition of employment becomes no different than the application of provisions for a starting wage, a vacation or sick-leave
policy or requiring the signing of a confidentiality agreementgeneral counsel for American Airlines, believes that arbitration does not necessarily take away the jury right, but instead serves as a mechanism to help sort out
the hundreds of thousands of cases that are without merit. Steinberg feels that
because of the volume of the employment cases that the system is having to deal
with, arbitration's quick resolution could serve as the floodgate to stop the over
abundance of cases in the courts. Id.
159 Lionel M. Schooler, Arbitration 1993-The New Frontierin ADR, TEX. LAw.,
Mar. 1, 1993, at 18.
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all elements that could be supported contractually by consideration. 16 0 Consideration is thus given by the offer of a job or, in
cases of existing employees, in the form of some benefit of
higher pay or better privileges in exchange for the signing of
the mandatory arbitration agreement. 61 Some critics argue that
there is unequal bargaining power when a potential employer
makes a mandatory arbitration provision conditional on employment for a potential hire. 162 The employee, however, has the
choice of refusing and working at another company that does
not institute such a policy. Mutuality of performance is accomplished when the employee signs the agreement and, as a result,
is allowed to work for the employer.
The agreement will not satisfy the tenets of contract law if the
employee is deceived into signing the clause or if the clause is
not properly explained so that the waiver is not made with full
knowledge of the provisions.163 This includes instances in which
the employee has not been informed by his agent, the union,
that he is going to be required to bring his disputes to arbitration. But as long as the employee is fully aware of the agreement that he is entering, then it will be upheld by the courts as a
valid contract. It will also be very difficult to prove the agreement as being unconscionable because of the Supreme Court's
recent endorsement of arbitration coupled with the Federal Arbitration Act (Congress's pro-arbitration message) and the16 arbi4
tration provisions of many of the federal civil rights laws.
While the phrase "mandatory arbitration" is indicative of a
non-consensual act, the choice is actually completely consensual
in nature. The provision is only mandatory if the individual
chooses to accept the job offer and all of the contingencies coming with it, including a contingency that all disputes must be
adjudicated in an arbitral forum.'65 The choice being made is
not whether a dispute will be heard, but rather where the dispute
should be decided.
160 Evan J. Spelfogel, Legal and Practical Implications of ADR and Arbitration in
Employment Disputes, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. LJ. 247, 263 (1993).
16, It is unlikely that an employer would be able to terminate an existing employee for refusing to sign a mandatory arbitration agreement because of unfair
bargaining considerations.
162 Abrams, supra note 104, at 550, 561.
163 See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 61 (1995).
164 See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
165 Spelfogel, supra note 160, at 264.
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An employee's waiver of access to a judicial forum in no way
indicates a foregoing of justice. The Supreme Court affirmed
the fairness of arbitration in Mitsubishi, stating "[S] o long as the
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function."' 6 6
B.

FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN ARBITRATION

To preserve the fairness of arbitration, it is important that the
employee is offered many of the same rights and remedies that
one would find in the judicial forum. 16' This not only makes
arbitration fair, but also allows the defendant to show the court,
if the forum is challenged, that while the employee waived the
judicial forum, there was no harm because arbitration offered
the same substantive rights as those in a trial.' 68
One way that employers can insure that substantive rights are
protected is to subscribe to a formal set of arbitration rules for
the hearing.'69 The American Arbitration Association has issued
a set of rules that protect rights of all parties involved in the
arbitration.7 0 Kirby Wilcox, a partner at San Francisco's Morrison & Foerster, said about the new rules: "[Y]ou are getting
something close to the type of hearing that you would have had,
had you had a bench trial in state or federal court."7' These

types of arbitration rules, which protect the parties' rights, lend
credibility to the arbitration and decrease the chances that a
court might find the hearing unfair upon appeal. The rights
worthy of protection include the employee's right to be represented by an attorney. 7 2 Also, there should be a minimal level
of discovery present so that all of the facts of the dispute can be
adequately presented by both sides.'7 3 The amount of discovery
that is allowed must not only satisfy the employer's economic
1- Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985).
167 Jorge Aquino, AAA Turns Work-Place Arbitrators Into Judges, TEX. LAW., Aug.
15, 1994, at 1.
168 Id.

169 Arnold M. Zack, New Uses of the Due Process Protocol: The Expanding Role of
ADR in the Worplace, 7 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REi'. 178, 179 (1996).
170 George H. Friedman, New Arbitration Rules in Place for Resolving Employment
Disputes, EMPLOYMENT L. STRATEGIST, July 1996, at 1.
171 Aquino, supra note 167, at 1.
172 Arbitration: Revised AAA Arbitration Procedures Reflect Due Process Task Force
Scheme, DAILY LAB. REP., May 28, 1996, at D6 [hereinafter Arbitration].
173 Id.
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goals but also satisfy due process, a difficult balance to strike. 17 4
Too little discovery begins to circumvent the protection of rights
standards set forth in Gilmer, but too much discovery will simply
be a copy of the inefficient court system.175
The selection of the arbitrator is another key element to the
fairness of the arbitration. The arbitrator should be chosen by
both sides from a pool that is marked by demographic diversity.' 76 This is an area which most critics of mandatory arbitration point to as having serious deficiencies. 77 Many plaintiffs
groups argue that ninety percent of arbitrators are older, white
78
males, and, as a result, will have a bias toward the employer.1
If the company is allowed to select the arbitrator, a court may
strike down the agreement because it would be unconscionable
for the employer not only to impose the forum the employee
must have his claim heard in, but also the individual who will
hear it. On the other hand, the plaintiff should not be allowed
to select the arbitrator for exactly the same reasons. The best
solution is to allow the parties to act in concert together where
an arbitrator is selected that both parties accept.
It is also important that the arbitrator chosen has some experience in the past with labor and employment statutes and can
rule fairly in this complex area of the law without having to rely
on "gut feelings." This also ensures that both sides become educated as to the application of employment law to possibly prevent future disputes in the workplace.
X.

CONCLUSION

HawaiianAirlines marked the beginning of what has become a
troubling trend in the airline industry-allowing employees to
pursue civil rights claims outside the arbitral provisions of the
RLA. HawaiianAirlines and its progeny not only undermine employers' ability to rely on the RLA, but also subject these employers to protracted litigation which drains company time and
174

Barclay & Carmell, supra note 131, at 24.

175

Id.

Arbitration, supra note 172, at D6.
But see Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20 ("Gilmer first speculates that arbitration panels
will be biased. However, '[w]e decline to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to
retain competent, conscientious and impartial arbitrators . . .' [m]oreover, the
arbitrators are required to disclose any circumstances which might preclude [the
arbitrator] from rendering an objective and impartial determination.").
178 Aquino, supra note 167, at 1.
176
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money, possibly interfering with transportation services to the
nation.
Employers have three options to recapture these lost employee claims to arbitration: (1) incorporate federal civil rights
statutes into the collective-bargaining agreement, which may require the contractual review of the RLA system boards; (2) attempt to use "unwritten customs" as a means of forcing review of
the collective-bargaining agreement and reinstating the jurisdiction of the RLA; or (3) require employees to sign mandatory
arbitration agreements to compel any dispute that courts deem
outside the jurisdiction of the RLA to arbitration. While it is
apparent from some of the cases cited and competing policies
discussed in this Comment that mandatory arbitration is in a
state of flux, employers should find comfort in Gilmer and its
progeny which demonstrate a decided trend towards the enforceability of these agreements. Mandatory arbitration agreements appear to be the most promising way for airline
employers to enjoy the full benefits of arbitration as they did
pre-HawaiianAirlines. Through mandatory arbitration, ground
lost to the recharacterization of "minor disputes" can be
regained through contracts submitting any dispute outside the
RLA to arbitration.
Finally, it is worth noting that for mandatory arbitration
agreements to work, employers must fashion the agreements in
a manner indicating a knowing waiver on the part of the employee as well as references to federal civil rights statutes that are
intended to be included within the arbitration provisions.
When drafting the mandatory arbitration agreements, the employer must be certain that (1) the employee makes a knowing
waiver of the judicial forum when he or she signs, (2) the arbitration contain enough of the elements of a courtroom trial so
that substantive rights are protected (but the process is somewhat stripped down so as to retain its time savings value), (3) the
selection of the arbitrator involves both parties, and (4) all of
the elements of contract law are satisfied when the agreement is
made. If these four goals can be accomplished, then airline employers can continue to rely on arbitration as an efficient and
cost-effective means of employment dispute resolution.

